First Anniversary of Georgia's bloodied nose

Georgia's ill fated attempt to reclaim South Ossetia and Abkhazia was a total disaster. Was it wrong advice from "friends" or just an Indiana Jones style adventure from Tbilisi? Russia did not lose time to crush the over optimistic Georgians and practically annex South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Click on map to enlarge.

August 7-8, 2008 were memorable days.

The whole world was glued to the TV sets for the stunning opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics. The "Bird's Nest", or the Beijing National Stadium had become the epicenter of the world.

Yet on practically the same day, the tiny Caucasian state of Georgia had launched massive attacks on the secessionist South Ossetia province, directly challenging Russia. The timing of the Georgian attack was very bizarre and intriguing: A major offensive within a few hours of the Beijing Olympics opening ceremonies? What was going on and who was really pushing for such a suicidal showdown?

The Georgian government claimed it was only responding to the constant shelling and intimidation from South Ossetia and was forced to send in its tanks to retake the rebel-held regional capital Tsikavali. Tbilisi wanted to swiftly reoccupy South Ossetia, but this large scale offensive was bizarre both in its timing and the ultra optimism about its possible success. Moscow did not find all this funny and the Russian Bear got ready to pounce back, and it did.



Georgia's tensions with Russia and the two breakaway regions have always been high since the collapse of the Soviet Union, but they became even higher ever since Mikhael Saakashvili came to power on 25 January 2004. The new President was determined to move Georgia much closer to the Western sphere and out of the Russian zone of influence, as if Russia did not exist next door. Georgia demanded the closure of all Russian military bases on its territories, put itself firmly in the Western camp, established supposedly very close ties with the "Oil and Gas obsessed" Bush administration and even applied to join NATO as a full member state: this was the ultimate insult to Russia.



Georgia's anti Russian stance since the fall of the Soviet empire was amplified by the training of the Georgian troops by some 170 NATO military advisers and were supplied with Western military fatigues and some military hardware. The Georgians obviously came to have a highly overestimated and distorted image of their new military might and political support from the forces opposing Russia. And that proved to be a fatal miscalculation.



Mr Saakashvili was also eagerly waiting for the day he would try to bring a military solution to the Ossetia and Abkhazia problems and restore Tbilisi's authority over these regions once and for all, just like he had successfully done in Adjaria-Batumi in 2004. (Important to note that Adjaria has no common borders with Russia, an crucial fact in Georgia's military success).







The message from this Russian soldier to the Georgians is finger clear. The picture is of a Russian convoy on the battlefront. The Russian easily crushed all forms of organised Georgian armed resistance.





Moscow's response was pretty swift, with mounting pressure to destabilize the Georgian Government through South Ossetia and of Abkhazia, which both share long borders and close ties with Russia. Moscow claimed to be under the obligation to defend the Russian citizens of these provinces and moved towards the recognition of these regions as "independent". Just like the West had acted to recognize the legitimacy of Kosovo's Independence from Serbia. Therefore the rationale was straight forward:If the West can recognize a separate Kosovo, then why not recognize independent Ossetia and Abkhazia? Georgia called all these developments as "shameless land grabs", while Moscow called them "self determination of these freedom seeking Russian citizens".



The war between the two looked inevitable, but few expected Saakashvili to send in his troops first! The ant attacking the elephant type of a mismatch.



In any case, something went wrong with president Saakashvili's entourage, when he decided to force a war. He had indeed timed this military attacks to coincide with the Olympics despite the claims otherwise, but that looked a bit like a medieval military strategy. Countries used to attack enemy states when the other King was away for a while on a hunting expedition in the remote woods or attending a prince's week long wedding festivities...



Vladimir Putin was in fact in Beijing when the news of the attacks broke out, but he did not waste any time to fly to the conflict zone and assume direct control of the events and assume the driver's seat. Within a few hours Moscow had already moved in. The Russian army recaptured South Ossetia and the tanks were on their way to Gori, into Georgia proper. The Russians soon cut the main road linking the capital Tbilisi to the ports on the Black Sea. All significant military and strategic sites in Georgia were bombarded and the country's fragile infrastructure heavily damaged or simply occupied. The Russian Black Sea fleet imposed a total maritime embargo. Poti and the nearby town of Seneki were taken. Russian troops reached the outskirts of Tbilisi and established checkpoints. The Tbilisi international airport was shut down, while the military airfields of Marneuli and Vaziani were heavily bombed.



Like in most wars, the civilian populations paid the ultimate price, as tens of thousands were ethnically cleansed and expelled from their homes. More than 400 people lost their lives, thousands injured and many more lost their homes and were unfortunately displaced.

A Georgian woman holding her baby cries over her damaged home in Gori, Georgia, just outside the breakaway province of South Ossetia Aug. 10, 2008. (David Mdzinarishvili/Reuters)









Georgia was practically fragmented into pieces and Tbilisi government was reduced to a mere scared spectator's role, hiding in underground shelters and arranging for the occasional candlelight press conferences to the media.



Naturally the war affected the whole region. Landlocked Armenia was deeply affected, as that neighbouring country's main supply and transit routes pass through Georgia and Poti's harbour in particular. The security of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline was also endangered, which made some people in Washington very nervous!



Same story in Abkhazia, where the secessionist forces took total control of all the disputed territories and expelled the collapsing Georgian regulars from the disputed and highly strategic Kodori Gorge (see map). They reasserted their absolute independence from Tbilisi and reaffirmed their strategic alignment with Mother Russia.



The short war turned out to be very ugly, a brutal lesson in regional "real-politics". Moscow was in no joking mood and sent a very loud and clear message: "Do not mess with me in my own historical backyard, and that includes the Caucasus". The same message to NATO was also crystal clear: "Better know your limits, because we are going to set them in any case!"



The war ended in August 17, and by that time there was not much left to fight for.



Either Tbilisi was badly misled by its over enthusiastic patrons and allies, or it had decided to adopt a fatalistic "It's now or never'' type of cow-boy approach to re-establish its authority over south Ossetia and Abkhazia. The jury is still out, but the real reasons for such adventurous approach were probably a mix of the two scenarios.





Who looks more scared: Georgian President Saakashvili or his bodyguards?

Note the use of NATO sub-machine guns as opposed to the classical Russian AK-47s, as part of Georgia's deliberate "Western" image remake.







The war was indeed short and very unequal. The total capitulation of Georgia was not surprising. Rather more surprising was Moscow's swift and determined response as well as the lack of any tangible support from Georgia's supposed allies in the West. Tbilisi's flirtation with NATO and especially Washington was exposed to its bare bones and Saakashvili had nowhere to hide. Moscow could have taken him down along with his government, but chose to spare his life and not to topple the Government. Tens of thousands of Georgian refugees were not as fortunate as their well spoken but obviously so wise president. They are still suffering today.



As a result, South Ossetia and Abkhazia became even more independent than before. The Georgian army will need years to rebuild itself and its credibility as a viable fighting force. The country's infrastructure was heavily damaged and a huge humanitarian problem. Not many positives for Georgia.

Most observers blame Saakashvili for this catastrophe. The United States and NATO could not do much except for sending couple of warships with "humanitarian aid'' to support the victimised Georgian brothers. Tbilisi's government was reminded something most seventh graders around the world would know: You do not mess with Russia in his own backyard, otherwise you will get a very bloodied nose, crippled arms and an amputated leg or two.

Georgia cried foul and blamed the separatist movements, but her own treatment of Georgia"s minorities does not inspire much confidence. The very sorry state of the Armenian minority in the southern Javakhk-Akhalkalaki region is another serious case of concern. Tbilisi needs to have a hard look in the mirror before formulating any kind of accusations of separatism toward the want away minorities. Javakhk’s Armenians face almost systematic discrimination, their churches confiscated and converted, schools forgotten and the region's already archaic infrastructure abandoned. There is a state of total desolation and neglect of Javakhk's socio-economic situation, in a concerted effort to alter that province’s ethnic composition and assimilate the population into "mainstream" Georgian.





President Serge Sarkisyan of Armenia greeting his Georgian counterpart in Yerevan. Saakashvili assured that he is sparing no efforts to improve the treatment of the Armenian minority in Georgia, but concrete results are scarce. Some felt that Armenia gave the Georgian President too much respect he did not fully deserve. Armenia is landlocked, badly needs Georgia for most external trade and transit and suffered huge financial losses because of the war. The borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan are closed due to embargo and conflict.





So what was the mystery behind Georgia's ill-fated adventures? Were there promised political as well as military support which failed to materialize? Did Saakashvili think that his western education, fluent English language skills, media savvy approach and CNN-friendly sound bites would be enough to stop the Russian tanks from crushing his troops and destroying his country?



Now Saakashvili can certainly kiss goodbye to South Ossetia and Abkhazia, both firmly attached to Russia. His very risky poker move backfired and his allies and advisers did not have a plan B to rescue him from losing face and territory. On the eve of the war's first anniversary, a NATO spokesman in Brussels even announced that "Georgia is not yet ready for NATO membership", an admission of total failure.





Both NATO and Uncle Sam were reduced to marginal observers while Putin was firmly in the driver's seat.





Even American vice president Joseph Biden's recent address to the Tbilisi Parliament could not mask the plain and painful truth. Financial aid to reconstruct Georgia may pour in from the West but that is not enough to stop Russian tanks or retake lost territories. There are definite limits of what Washington and NATO can accomplish in the Caucasus. All the flag raising ceremonies, bonfires, candle vigils marking the first anniversary of the war will not do much in terms of getting South Ossetia and Abkhazia back.



As Elton John would sing:



It's sad, so sad,

It's a sad, sad situation,

And it's getting more and more absurd.

Oh it seems to me that sorry seems to be the hardest word.

© Krikor Tersakian,  Aug 5, 2009