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The Lebanese civil war was a long and high intensity violent conflict that lasted from 1975 to the early nineties when the Taïf (Saudi Arabia) accords were signed and ratified in 1989. The tiny county of 10453 km2, once known as the “Paris” of the Near East, still is a powder keg ready to explode in sporadic or sustained violence. The Lebanese civil war was in fact inevitable from the day the French Mandate took over the region known as Greater Syria. They carved a country out of historical Syria to create a homeland tailor -made for their traditional clients, the Christian Catholics called Maronites. The socio-political very complex and archaic system based upon religion that was worked out and survived to post colonial times, contained the seeds of guaranteed and interminable conflict and violence.
A maronite clergyman blessing a Lebanese forces tank before battle
A maronite clergyman blessing a Lebanese forces tank before battle
It is very difficult to put a specific date to the end of the Lebanese civil war, but the official start has a very infamous date: April 13, 1975, when the Christian right wing Phalangist militiamen stopped a bus full of Palestinians returning from a celebration and passing through the working class suburb of Ain El Remmaneh. The Phalangist, in retaliation to an earlier attack on Christians, opened fire with automatic firearms, killing the mostly civilian passengers to death. The country was in total chaos and the civil war was “officially” on. The bus attack was the prelude to the indiscriminate attacks, killings and horrible violence.
Broadly speaking, the Lebanese civil war is often thought and described as an inter-sectarian bloody conflict between the mostly right wing Christians, against a coalition of Muslim and leftist forces allied with the P.L.O. The War left hundreds of thousands dead, naturally mostly innocent civilians (no available official figure is possible). A long war, where the conservative Maronites did their best to resist change and fight for their very survival against the mostly Sunni, Druze, Shia and Palestinians. Therefore, “Christian against Muslim” became a common and somehow simplistic description of the Civil War. This narrative, however, disregards the fact that the warring sides were not monolithic or “pure” along ideology and religious lines. In this essay, I will argue that some of the most despicable, unpredictable and yet highly significant violence in Lebanon occurred within the “Christian” camp. These intra-Christian violence left more long lasting political schisms and consequence than say Maronite – Sunni killings, if we are to judge by the political affiliations and coalition of present day Lebanese politics. Old foes like mainstream Sunni and Phalange are now very close allies, while the various Maronite factions attacked by the Phalange are still bitter enemies.
An iconic picture: refugees pleading with the gunmen amid the destruction
I will highlight the intra Christian violence mainly through the life of assassinated President-elect of Lebanon Bashir Gemayel (1947-1982), the son of the Kataeb (Phalanges) party founder and commander in chief of the Phalange- Lebanese Forces until his assassination. Bashir was a charismatic, visionary military and political leader with great conviction and frightening honesty. But he was also very ruthless and violent in achieving his goals. He took over the Phalange militia by late 1977, turned it into a formidable fighting force with the gradually direct and open help of Israel. He forcibly suppressed allied “rival” Maronite armed militias, did not tolerate any dissent outside his rule, attacked and massacred other Christians, fought the Left and Palestinians and dared to challenge the greatest taboo of it all: open and extensive political and military cooperation with Israel. As a direct result, he was elected President of Lebanon on August 23, 1982, while west Beirut was still under Israeli occupation. The P.L.O. was by then defeated and had left Beirut under U.S.A. guarantees, allowing the exile of the Palestinians leadership, cadres and thousands of fedayeen fighters to Tunis. (Fisk, p.609) The P.L.O stayed in Tunis until Arafat was allowed back to the West Bank after the Oslo accords in 1993.Meanwhile, Bashir Gemayel seemed to have won it all: he had defeated the Lebanese Leftist coalition with Israel’s help, the P.L.O. was expelled, and he had subdued almost all his Christian allies and potential rivals in the territories he controlled with an iron fist. Then the previously unthinkable happened, as the most feared, admired and hated person in the country, Bashir Gemayel was officially elected President of Lebanon. (Fisk, p.329) He was promptly assassinated by a fellow Maronite before being sworn in (September 14, 1982). He still divides opinions sharply but he is respected as a unique personality by friend, foe and victim alike.
As a direct result of his assassination, the Phalangist forces entered West Beirut Palestinian camps and committed the Sabra and Shatila massacres on September 16, 1982 (Fisk, P444-446). Hundreds of unprotected Palestinians were murdered by the angry Christians, under the watchful eyes of Ariel Sharon and the Israeli army who allowed them in the camps (Fisk, p. 360, 372). (note: Bashir was killed by an enemy Maronite, therefore why were Palestinians murdered to avenge his death?).
Bashir Gemayel (Photo: lebaneseforces.com)
Historical background of the Lebanese Christian right to Bashir ascension:
“Part political idealist and part storm trooper, (Bashir) Gemayel, 34, has shown he will use whatever means necessary to achieve his nationalist goals. His supporters argue that Lebanon's dire condition requires just that sort of toughness. Opponents claim that he is a fierce political animal dedicated to narrow sectarian aims”. (Time article, Sept. 1982)
According to British ‘The Independent’ journalist Robert Fisk, the founder of the Lebanese Phalange party Pierre Gemayel openly admitted to him that it was during his participation at the Berlin Olympics of 1936 that he came to fall in love with Fascism. Gemayel was then the Football team captain of Lebanon and as a young Maronite under the French Mandate; he was very impressed by the rigor, strength and discipline of the Nazi youth. “When I was in Berlin, Nazism did not have the reputation which it has now”. (Fisk, p. 65) Gemayel saw appropriate discipline and thought ‘We need discipline in the Middle East’. There was the model to emulate to shape the Lebanese youth. Gemayel insisted he did not care about the Nazi ideology, just the discipline. Consequently, on his return to Lebanon, he founded the political and paramilitary Phalanges party , named after Spain’s General Franco’s Phalanx brigades. Pierre Gemayel was not a Nazi, but a staunch Christian Maronite who considered Lebanon should be part of the Western world and protect the catholic heritage by avoiding any Arab identity. He embraced theories that the Lebanese are descendants of the Phoenicians, Byzantine, and Levantine etc. In short, Lebanese Christians were anything but “Arab”. These views were of course not very absurd and were accepted by many other (but not all) Christians. However, the message was delivered often in a radical and isolationist rhetoric, pointing to an Arab discrimination from a minority! In sharp opposition to this Maronite rejectionist ideology, the Greek Orthodox (descendants of the pre-Arab conquest Byzantine Empire), and even the Greek Catholic have always been more moderate and accommodating to their immediate Arab environment. Some of the essential root causes of Intra Christian conflict can be traced to the tensions between the staunchly ultramontanist (papist) Maronites and the other Christians who beg to disagree and keep their proud historical roots in the Near East, not Europe.
The Kataeb (Phalange) party founder Pierre Gemayel with sons Amin and Bashir. Amin was elected President of the Republic upon the assassination of his brother Bashir in 1982.
The Kataeb (Phalange) party founder Pierre Gemayel with sons Amin and Bashir. Amin was elected President of the Republic upon the assassination of his brother Bashir in 1982.
The Phalange party grew stronger throughout the post WW2 era. It was the main pro-government force when pro-Nasserite Arabist opposition tried to topple the Government of Camille Chamoun in 1958, a short and bloody of the 1975 civil war. That conflict had once again opposed West-looking Maronites to the Leftist coalition that included many Christians. The Christians in the opposition thought that Lebanon was set up as a Maronite protectorate, a remnant of the colonial system and that Lebanon must take a more balanced view towards the Arab world and revise the religion based political system favouring the Maronites. The 1958 mini civil war was “resolved” by the landing of U.S. Marines to the shores of Beirut. The ‘Eisenhower doctrine’ of direct military support against any “communist” takeover threat around the world was in full force (Fisk, p. 71). Meanwhile, large numbers of innocent civilians were killed in blind sectarian executions and street fighting before the arrival of the western “peacekeepers”.
The removal of the P.L.O. from Jordan after King Hussein defeated the Palestinian guerrilla changed the situation dramatically in Lebanon. Arafat and thousands of fighters fled to Beirut where they swelled the refugee camps that were set after the 1948 al-Nakba. The arrival of these heavily armed Palestinian groups set the stage for a round of clashes with the Maronite controlled Lebanese National Army in 1971. The mostly Lebanese Sunni opposition saw the arrival of the P.L.O. as a major boost to their chances to upset the status quo in their favour: Palestinians are mostly Muslims; therefore, they would surely support the local Sunni insurgency against the State in case of a war with the “Christians”. The pre- civil war rhetoric started to shape up. For the leftist media, the Christians became “Zionist agents”, “fascists” and “isolationists”, surely in reference to the roots of the Phalange in the 1930’s for their opposition to the P.L.O and political change.
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When the Civil War broke in 1975, the Lebanese Army stayed on the sidelines for a while then was paralyzed and split into several factions along religious lines. The Phalange filled the vacuum and very quickly became the de-facto government force in the Christian heartland along with Presidents Chamoun and Franjieh private militia in Beirut and in the North while the civil war escalated in 1975-76. In fact, the Christians would have been comprehensively defeated early on if not for the intervention of the Syrian Army. Syrian President Assad, himself a member of a minority group (Alawite) would not tolerate a defeat of the Christians and a P.L.O. victory / takeover of Lebanon. He promptly sent his tanks across the border to stop the Palestinians who had advanced and had appeared on the slopes of Mount Sannine, ready to overtake the Christian heartland in 1976 (Fisk, p. 81). Syrian military intervention saved the Christian heartland, paved the way for the emergence of Bashir Gemayel and definitely discredited the Phalangist / right wing historical arguments that the “Arabs are constantly plotting to destroy the Christians”.
By 1977 Bashir gradually consolidated his control of his father’s Phalange militia and then ruthlessly “unified” all the militant Christian right. He killed and alienated many by his extreme agenda and bloody hands. He succeeded in becoming the de facto ruler by the sword, shrewd leadership, directness, honesty. Because of the Israeli invasion, he was now president-elect, suddenly a great national hero for most Lebanese. This very fine line between a mass murderer and a national hero is often observed throughout history. Days before he was sworn in as President, President elect Bashir Gemayel was promptly assassinated by a fellow Christian Maronite opposed to his right wing policies. The rise and fall of Bashir are the mirror image of the difficult battle of survival of the Christians in their tiny country. It also highlights the unprecedented violence directed toward fellow Christians, a phenomenon practically absent in the Muslim and leftist camp.
Just one week before Bashir’s death, Time magazine published an article in 1982 entitled “Gemayel: Ruthless idealist” (Appendix I). This short article captures the essence of Bashir’s very violent trajectory and his propensity to use limitless force against fellow Christian rivals and allies to achieve a power in the name of preserving the Maronite country called Lebanon. His hatred towards the Palestinian armed presence in Lebanon and Nasser-style Arabism was matched by his intolerance of fellow Christians that did not share his views. The Time article summarizes all the paradoxes of a violent yet idealistic leader, just days before his assassination along with 23 of his comrades by a bomb planted just the floor above where he was having a meeting. It is telling that only a fellow Christian like Habib Shartouni could have access to such a secure building in the Ashrafieh Christian heartland of Beirut, the apartment of the assassin’s sister conveniently located for the purpose. Time sums it up best Bashir as “the man who lives by the sword”... , somehow predicting his inevitable assassination.
Background to Bashir Gemayel’s rise, the post Colonial Lebanese violence and the seeds of the perennial conflict
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I will not explore the deep mistrust between the Maronites and the Druze in Mount Lebanon, the Civil war and massacre of the Christians in 1860, (Fisk, p. 56) the Ottoman Empire’s capitulation to the French and the setting up of a Mutasarifiyah (district governorate) approved and guaranteed by France. Nor will it expand on the constant pressure mostly urban and wealthy Sunni exerted to make Lebanon more “Arab” and remove the Christian label from the country. The French Mandate was established after the “fall” of the Ottoman Empire. The arrival of the French rule was not at all considered a catastrophe for the Christians, who saw their power base increase steadily. The French imposed new administrative rules in Syria and Lebanon that sparked revolts in Syria (The Great Syrian Revolt, Provence), but not much violent dissent in Lebanon. The real challenge to the French colonial authorities was to ‘expand Lebanon’s boundaries without making the Christians a minority in their own country’ (Rogan, p. 216) The Maronites, after all, were happy with the emergence of their new state and they shared the conservative Catholic faith with their colonial masters. It was a very effective symbiotic relationship. After a very short occupation by forces loyal to Vichy, the Allied armies occupied Lebanon once more in 1941. (Fisk, p. 67)
The nominal independent state of Lebanon emerged from the chaos in the French colonial world in November 22, 1943. France was a defeated nation and could not hold onto her distant colonies. The inevitable departure of the French army resulted in the Lebanese National Pact. This covenant guaranteed the Presidency of the Republic to the Maronites, The Head of the Government (Prime Minister) to the Sunni community, while the President of the National Assembly was a post reserved to the Shiites. This national “Pact” was drafted based upon a very inaccurate and outdated census completed in the 1920’s, which gave the Maronites a relative “majority” in the country they did not actually have.
The Lebanese independence was declared in 1943 while Paris was still witnessing Nazi military parades on her boulevards, but that independence was not “granted” with ease. The colonial French forces just imploded and even there were infighting between forces loyal to the Vichy Government and the Free France movement of General De Gaulle. Several prominent Lebanese national leaders were jailed in remote Crusade era castles in South Lebanon. Future Maronite presidents Bechara El-Khouri and Camille Chamoun were those among arrested and jailed for conspiracy to overthrow the colonial rule. However, when independence came, the new system bore all the future seeds of conflict. How long would the Sunni deal with a centralizing Maronite President? Lebanon was a beautiful yet very unworkable mosaic of conflicting loyalties between all confessional groups. Lebanese internal system was extremely delicate and fragile, and no one had predicted the arrival of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians refugees and later the P.L.O. after their expulsion from Jordan in 1970 (Black September). A situation that would tip the balance of power and military might in favour of the Left. How long the disinherited and disregarded Shiite will stay put and not ask reward for their numerical superiority in a nominally democratic but highly confession - based system?
A Lebanese is always supposed to carry the “hawiyya” or identification certificate issued by the Interior Ministry. After the Name, Date and Place of Birth, the fourth information clearly spelled is the religious confession of the citizen. All Lebanese have to necessarily belong to one of the 18 or so officially recognized religious groups (Maronite, Rum Catholic, Rum Orthodox, Assyrian, Armenian Orthodox, Sunni, Shiite, Druze, Assyrian, Chaldean, Alawite and Jewish etc). Therefore, the very symbolic personal identification document of the Lebanese citizenship becomes the source of such violence and many executions. The identification document made the killings of innocent citizen easy by all militia. Asking the Hawiyya document of a passenger would give the needed info to the gunmen, and the wrong timing and place could mean indiscriminate or retaliatory kidnapping or plain slaying.
That bazooka is designed to be mounted on a light truck, not on a human shoulder! Lebanon has always been special. (Photo credit :AFP/Ramzi Haidar)
Classical Inter confessional violence:
Lebanese civil war witnessed very changing sets of alliances, especially with Syria, the de facto major broker in Lebanon. Since the creation of Greater Lebanon, Damascus has always felt cheated and considered tiny and prosperous Lebanon a lost limb of the Greater Syria. Maronites and other minorities beg to differ, of course. The Druze and the Maronites had ruled Mount Lebanon for centuries and they had a series of bloody civil wars, most famously in 1860, when the Druze finally defeated the Maronites who had been encroaching on Druze influence and territories in the Chouf Mountains. (Fisk, pp, 56,57, 110,118) That civil war, like many other major Lebanese historical events are totally absent from the official History books used in the country, but has long survived in the oral traditions and psyche of hatred and violence.
The Sunni in Lebanon have always been mostly urban based, with a few scattered villages in the south and the Beqaa. The Sunni were protected by the successive rulers of Lebanon, from the early Islamic conquests under the Rashidun Caliphs, to the Ayyubites, Mehmet Ali of Egypt and the Ottoman Empire: all Sunni powers. Hence, they have had no need to take refuge in the Lebanese mountains like the regionally tiny minorities such as the Maronites and the Druze, and to certain extend the marginalized Shiite. The Near East was a Sunni dominated world, and the urbanization and prosperity of that community is a vivid example. The civil war in 1975 brought forward the deep divisions of opinion within the Sunni community, and beside some fringe groups such as the Mourabitoon and other Nasserite pan-Arabs, few Sunni militia were prominent during the civil war. Therefore, there was no “pure” Sunni violence in Lebanon, even though the community actively took part in the hostilities and violence within the general opposition to the status quo. Therefore, it is safe to assume that there was no significant intra Sunni violence.
The same applies for the Druze, an offshoot of Shia Islam with rather secretive eastern Hindu mystic elements known only to a few “informed intellectuals” called al-Uqqal. They are considered heretics by most Sunni and Shia scholars yet tolerated throughout the centuries. The Druze represent only 5% of the Lebanese population, but have a much higher influence both politically and militarily than their numbers may suggest. The intra Druze violence was again non-significant during the civil war, as most Druze rallied behind the charismatic anti- government leader Kamal Jumblatt (assassinated by Syria in 1977) and later to his equally maverick son Waleed. The political “front” of the Druze community is the “Parti Socialist Progressiste”, present in Beirut and the Mount Lebanon where they defeated the Maronite right wing militias and drove them out in 1980’s just as they had done in 1860.
The Shiite community was previously relegated to a secondary role in the social and political margins, but was first empowered by the organizational skills of an Iranian born cleric named Imam Musa Sadr, founder of the Movement of the Disinherited Hope (Amal), (Fisk, p,93-94, 449). Sadr was later kidnapped and disappeared while on a “friendly” visit to Libya’s Muammar Kaddafi in 1978 never to be seen again. (Rogan, p. 412). The Iranian revolution in 1979 gave renewed hope and resources to Lebanon’s most community and the Hezbollah was the net result. The intra Shiite violence was again almost nonexistent, and the first violence they were involved in was fighting the right wing Christians and also attack the Palestinians in the South to reassert Shiite control over areas lost to the P.L.O. since 1969. The Amal movement is always been quite liberal and secular, while Hezbollah is more Islamist in nature but with amazing overture towards other minorities such as Greek Orthodox and Armenian. Hezbollah has been staunchly anti Zionist but surprisingly malleable towards Christians, unlike their fierce opposition to Saudi influenced and funded local Sunni politics.
We can therefore note that the non- Christian communities (Sunni, Shiite and Druze) did not experience any significant internal fighting. They generally showed a much greater sense of community solidarity based on faith and the common hatred they shared towards the Maronite right wing politics.
The 1936 Berlin Olympics were an inspiration to Pierre Gemayel, founder of the Christian Phalange party and militia. He was then captain of the Lebanese football team and he admired the discipline of the Nazi youth, without necessarily espousing their racist theories (Photo credit: http://www.ushmm.org/museum/exhibit/online/olympics/detail.php)
Maronite domination of the Christian: The rise of Bashir Gemayel and the cycle of intra Christian violence:
“The man who lives by the sword has very nearly died by it. In March 1979, a bomb was defused in his car. In February 1980, his 18-month-old daughter and three bodyguards were killed by a car bomb that did go off. Nonetheless, Gemayel continues to appear openly in public and insists on driving around alone, although he changes cars as often as ten times a day as a precaution. His security measures will almost certainly be tightened now that he has reached the pinnacle of national power: in a violent land, Bashir Gemayel has many enemies”. (Time magazine)
Bashir Gemayel started to become a household name as the new rising star of the Phalange militia in 1976-1977. Until then, a glass maker by the name of William Hawi was commander of the Phalange until he was killed at during the siege and later massacre of the Palestinian camp of Tel el-Zaatar. From the onset Bashir had the advantage of being the party president’s son. His older brother, the more pragmatic Amin was later himself elected and served as president to replace the assassinated president elect Bashir. Forming a military structure independent from his father’s party and forcibly integrating the other allied Christian militia under the “hygienic” (Fisk, p. 182) title of Lebanese Forces became Bashir’s main accomplishment and also the source of the most violent acts. Time calls him “liberator, warlord. Patriot and Power mad”. Certainly all of these were true and applied to the staunchly nationalistic Bashir. His forced “mergers” lasted up to 1982 until he succeeded in silencing all dissent. This internecine Christian infighting resulted in massacres, deportations and Bashir finally emerged as the only Za’im, effectively transforming the Lebanese Forces / phalangist militia into a very well armed and deadly fighting force that continued its “struggle” against the Muslim leftist forces.
Bashir Gemayel reviewing Phalange militia during the early days of the civil war
Here are some of the major events of this forcible subjugation of rival Christian forces in the areas under Phalangist control under Bashir:
-The forcible takeover of Byblos and the eviction of the Eddé:
Jubail or Byblos is a region that has given the word “Bible” to the world. Byblos was the traditional fiefdom of the prominent Maronite Eddé family. The Eddé were mostly liberal and centrist and were regarded as ‘weaklings’ by the right wing Christians. Émile Eddé was the patriarch of the family and was elected President of Lebanon from 1936-1941 during the French Mandate, founding the centrist and multi-faith Lebanese national Bloc (Al Kutlah al Wataniah). His son, Raymond Eddé (1913-2000), was very influential and respected minister, one of the rare Lebanese politicians held in high esteem by all Lebanese, regardless of faith. The open mindedness and centrist positions of Eddé were targeted by the right wing Phalange early on during the war. Eddé was the only Christian political figure to live in Muslim West Beirut, until his permanent self-imposed exile to France, as he lost his power base to the militant wings of his own Maronite community. The Druze leader Walid Jumblatt has said that the only politician worthy of respect and not have committed war crimes is Raymond Eddé. That respect and honesty Eddé enjoyed were perhaps the reasons he was not tolerated by his own allies.
Byblos (Jubail) was the fiefdom of the Eddé family but fell under phalange influence at the start of the civil war
The overtaking of the mostly Greek Catholic town of Zahlé:
Zahlé is called the ‘Bride of the Beqaa’ valley, the largest exclusively Christian city in the Middle East, mostly Greek Catholic. Zahlé is the administrative centre and the economic hub of all agricultural produce of the Beqaa, the world famous Kesara wine cellars and all the agro-alimentary business so essential to the Lebanese economy. That explains the historical close business and social relationship that had existed between the Zahlé and the surrounding Sunni and Shia communities. Zahlé had no interest to isolate herself from the Muslim grain, potatoes and fruits producing villages, and had been moderately right wing in politics but not enough to Bashir’s liking. The local leading families, such as the Skeif, were notoriously reluctant to harm the symbiotic relationship with the Muslims countryside (a situation very reminiscent of the Maydan / Jabal Druze situation 'The Great Syrian Revolt’ in Provence). Zahlé could prosper only through trade, and trade was possible only through the Muslim farmers of the area. Therefore, the Islam-Christian good neighbors relationships were too precious to break. Nevertheless, the Lebanese forces of Bashir Gemayel effectively took control of the city, introduced hundreds of armed fighters from across the Mount Lebanon through the gorges of Sannine Mountain. Bashir “unashamedly encouraged the Phalangist inside the town to attack the Syrians in the area, and in 1981 Zahlé was effectively under Syrian siege”. (Fisk, p. 188-189)
The town of Zahlé is both picturesque and strategically located in the rich Beqaa valley. The Sannine Mount Lebanon christian heartland lies behind. It is the largest purely Christian town in the middle east.
The net result was the alienation of the locals and the very heavy price they paid when the Syrian army violently attacked the town in December 1980 to evict the Phalangist that it considered ‘alien’ to the region. Bashir’s forces were eventually evacuated to Mount Lebanon but the town suffered very heavy destruction. The Greek Catholic influence had given way to the military control of the Maronite forces and the result was heavy property and human losses. The centuries old tradition of peaceful coexistence if the locals and the Muslim neighbours was another major casualty.
-The assassination of President Suleiman Franjieh’s son Toni and 23 members of his family.
“In June 1978, Gemayel's forces lashed out brutally against former President the Suleiman Franjieh, who was one of his chief political opponents among the Christian population. In a lightning raid on the Franjieh summer resort village of Ehden, Phalangist soldiers murdered the ex-President's son and political heir Tony, along with his wife and two-year-old daughter. Gemayel coldly dismissed the episode as a "social revolt against feudalism." (Time article)
The Maronites of the north are deeply divided into two competing zones. The Franjieh (President Suleiman Franjieh) control the area just east of the Sunni city of Tripoli. They have always been very moderate and pro-Syrian proud Maronite nationalists, with good ties to the Baathist Hafez el-Assad. It is said the future president Suleiman had participated in the machine gun massacre of the rival Douaihy family near Zghorta in 1957 and that he had fled to Syria and forged a close relationship with his Baathist protectors (Fisk, p. 76). These ties helped Suleiman get elected President of the Republic the same year Assad grabbed power in Damascus in 1970 after a bloodless coup. Farther up the mountains from Zghorta and towards the Cedars, the Maronite families are traditionally on the extreme right of the Maronite militancy. Samir Geagea, who after the death of Bachir became leader of the Phalangist – Lebanese Front militia, boasted from the town of Besharreh (also the birthplace of Gibran Khalil Gibran).
The victims of the Ehden massacre: Toni Franjieh, his family and relatives.
In June 1978 Bashir had started to assert control over all Christians and targeted ex-President Suleiman Franjieh’s son and political heir Toni. The Franjieh were long time allies to the Phalange and now Toni had suddenly become a “legitimate” target for Bachir. It is thought that Franjieh clan’s close ties to Syria were totally unacceptable to Bashir, who ordered a very daring and unprecedented violent military expedition against a Maronite ally. In a surprise attack, the Phalange commandos attacked the town of Ehden and murdered Tony along with his wife, daughter, and dozens of guards and family members. The operation was executed under the command of Bachir’s lieutenants Samir Geagea (later a convicted war criminal) and Tony Hobeika (of Sabra and Shatila massacre fame). This atrocious massacre was done in the name of unification of Maronite forces under one command, but did nothing to bolster Maronite unity. The two clans are still harsh enemies and espouse diametrically opposed position in national politics. Interestingly, the Time article mentions that Bachir later justified these attacks as a “social revolt against feudalism”. He meant to say that the Franjieh were “feudal”, implying that the Gemayel were not.
-The elimination of the Chamoun clan:
“And in July 1980, Gemayel's troops virtually wiped out the Christian militia of ex-President Camille Chamoun's National Liberal Party for refusing to accept the Phalangist line”. (Time article)
It was during President Camille Chamoun’s reign that the 1956 had taken place. Chamoun was a staunch nationalist and charismatic leader, with his roots in Druze dominated Mount Lebanon. He was thought to be more Anglophile than the Francophile Gemayel, and had extraordinary close relations with Jordan’s King Hussein. Chamoun was as committed as Gemayel to use whatever means necessary to keep Lebanon under the control of the Maronite elite, he heritage of the French Mandate. His National Liberal Party (Al Ahrar) at a time included ‘conservative Shiite and Sunni political leaders and members (Fisk, p. 71), but this was by and large Chamoun’s private party and militia. During the civil war, Chamoun’s militia, Noumour al-Ahrar (Liberal Tigers) was as hard line as the Phalange fighting in the Beirut suburbs against the Muslims, but less powerful. By 1980 the ailing Chamoun had given the control of his private militia to his horse and fun loving son Dany. Bashir had little time for his rival Dany and was tired of sharing power with him (Fisk, p.165) and sent shock troops in a surprise attack and eliminate the Noumour as a fighting force at the massacre of Safra on July 7, 1980. Dany Chamoun’s life was spared unlike 83 of his followers who were killed on the spot; Dany fled to Muslim West Beirut for refuge, and was finally assassinated along with his family by the successor of Bashir, Samir Geagea in 1990. (Fisk, pp. 167-168)
Chamoun and Gemayel families were the closest of possible allies, having formed the very axis of Maronite right wing nationalism and militancy. Bashir, however, decided to simply finish off the Chamoun family as a force within the Christian camp. Perhaps, he was aiming to kill two birds at the same time by eliminating Dany Chamoun as potential future rival for the post of President of the Republic.
-The attacks on the neutral Armenian community:
After the massacres on the Maronite Tigers and the massacre of Ehden, the Phalange under Bashir had less appetite to the slightest dissenting voice within the Christian areas he firmly controlled while fighting the overall war against the Left and the Palestinians.
The Armenians were rather prosperous second and third generation survivors of the 1915 Genocide perpetrated by the Young Turks (Fisk, 59). Therefore, they were historically very grateful to the Muslim Arabs for their very survival and could not imagine sending their militia to attack Muslims under orders from the Maronites. Fighting and shelling Muslims would have been simply unthinkable. Armenian refugees were not abused by the Arabs while fleeing the Turks and were mostly welcomed throughout the Arab world during and after the Genocide. Being so ungrateful to the Arab Muslim hospitality and generosity just to please Bashir was not an option, even if it meant being killed and shelled.
Armenian neighborhood in Beirut -Arax street, Bourj Hammoud (Photo: http://www.trekearth.com/gallery/Middle_East/Lebanon/West/Beyrouth/Bourj_Hammoud/photo437536.htm)
Hence, the Armenians political leadership adopted the famous “Positive Neutrality” policy, trying to be a moderating force within the total chaos of the civil war and avoid being subjugated by the nationalist Christian camp. The Maronites, however, saw this Armenian ‘positive neutrality’’ as cowardice or simply betrayal to the Christian values and mounted an all out war. Fierce street fighting broke out after Maronites refugees from the southern town of Damour encroached into Armenian neighborhoods in East Beirut. Heavy military attacks were launched against the Armenian populated areas, resulting in dozens of dead on both sides and utter destruction of property in these working class areas. Paradoxically, wounded Armenian fighters were smuggled into Muslim controlled West Beirut Hospitals to avoid being killed by the Christian enemies while hospitalized. Wounded Christian Armenians finding safe haven in Muslim areas was a powerful reminder that violence can take incomprehensible twists, especially considering the official Maronite rhetoric that their war was fought in order protect Christianity in Lebanon against Muslims.
Thousands of Armenians attend the service to commemorate the 96th anniversary of the Armenian Genocide in Antelias, Lebanon (Holy See of Cilicia) (Photo Aztag daily / Ashnag)
-The Greek Orthodox and their uneasy relationship with the Maronites:
The Christians in the Middle East have always been split between the ones looking to Latin West for leadership and guidance and the “Orientals”. The Maronites, a staunchly Catholic sect named after the fifth century monk called St. Maroun, had “unwisely associated themselves with the Crusades” (Fisk, p. 55); and have always been on the margins of the Arab world. Their archbishop is headquartered in Bekerké, Lebanon, but he is in full communion with the Vatican. On the other hand, the Greek Orthodox community, legacy of the Byzantine Empire’s orthodoxy, is deeply rooted in oriental Arab pre-Islamic culture. “They instinctively possess the best intuitive feel for the psychology and politics of the Muslims”. The Greek Orthodox have always had more understanding of the Muslims and enjoyed their confidence more than any other Christian sect (Fuller, p.162), another source of jealousy and propensity for violence. Muslims traditionally see the Latin West as somehow evil since the Crusades. The Orthodox (Greek and Armenian) are not Latin and have deep roots in the Middle East way before the Islam conquest of the Rashidun Empire. Together with the Greek Catholic, the Orthodox form what is called as the Melchites, divided from the Maronites over the single divine nature of Christ during the Byzantine Empire. (Fisk, p, 56)
Interestingly, Lebanon has traditionally reserved the Foreign Affairs ministry post to a Greek Orthodox and that is not a coincidence. Greek Orthodox, with their archbishop in Damascus, are much open to pan Arab-ism, prone close cooperation with Islam and often act as a bridge between eastern and western clashing ideologies in the Middle East. The Greek Orthodox Christians were in fact mostly sympathizers of a ‘third way’: rejecting Maronite isolationism and hegemony, and steering away from an Islamic oriented pan-Arabism. The result is the concept of a ‘Greater Syria’ and a secular homeland for all the peoples of the Fertile Crescent, regardless of faith. This “third way” had its main expression in the creation of the Syrian Social National Party (SSPN), known as Kawmi Souri, very strong in some Mount Lebanon villages and the caza of Batroun in the north. The dedicated membership of this surprisingly tenacious and militant party is drawn mainly from the Greek Orthodox and some more secular minded Druze, Maronites and even Shiites. Kawmis are the fiercest enemies of the Phalange. This has been a decade long visceral and very bloody enmity preceding the civil war and that continues to date. Habib Shartouni, the assassin of President Bashir Gemayel was member of this party. Note that the Lebanese Communist Party also had some prominent Christian leaders (e.g. Georges Hawi). However, that party was marginal in a country where Communism is seen as a dangerous, alien, anti Islam and anti Christian concept.
“The SSNP was established in Lebanon in the 1930s by (the Greek Orthodox) Antun Saadah who hoped to unite the Levantine nations and form a "Greater Syria." Even though it fought in alliance with the Muslims and leftists in the Civil War, its membership was primarily Christian and its political stance was right-wing; in fact, its red hurricane symbol was modeled after the Nazi swastika. The SSNP has a long history of terrorism and subversion in Lebanon. Saadah was executed by the Lebanese government in 1949, after launching an abortive coup attempt. The SSNP was active in the 1958 Civil War, where it fought on the pro-Western side. In December 1961, an SSNP armored battalion commander staged the Lebanese Army's only significant attempted coup d'état against the government”. (Library of Congress)
Antun Saadah was the Greek Orthodox founder of the staunchly anti right wing party SSNP (Kawmi Souri). He dreamed of uniting peoples of all confessions in a secular Greater Syria.
Therefore, it is clear that the Maronite right wing and the Greek Orthodox have often been at odds, and that is a perennial source of violence plaguing the Christian heartland. This has divided communities, split families, caused fratricidal murders because of opposing visions of what Christianity should be like in an overwhelmingly Aram Muslim environment.
Concluding thoughts:
Religion in Lebanon is not just about pure faith. Religion has become the only factor upon which a person becomes a known entity in his living environment and become part of the larger society. Religion gives “identity” to a Lebanese. Knowing a total stranger’s religion is often more important than knowing his name. The person you meet on the street is first a Christian or a Sunni, and then his name happens to be “Georges” or “Ali”. Other details can follow, like the region he originates from etc. This is the very unfortunate legacy of both old and recent history, especially since the late Ottoman period of reforms and the French Mandate, where all boundaries were drawn along confessional lines rather than practical administrative considerations. The Lebanese constitution was drafted on the sorry assumption that a quota system based on confession is the only way to guarantee stability and insure the survival of the Christians. Religion is enshrined in the Constitution, and in the psychology of every Lebanese, carrying the dangers of violence.
Bashir Gemayel' Funeral (Photo: Corbis)
It is almost impossible to be just a Lebanese Nationalist without mentioning religion. Ideology and the formation of a common belonging fail repeatedly to transcend religion. Herewith lays the trap of intra Christian violence. The Maronites and the mostly right wing nationalist have traditionally been very reluctant to tolerate or even contemplate dissenting views from other Christian minorities within the context of a national belonging. Greeks Orthodox, Armenians, Greek Catholics, Assyrians etc are all expected to rally behind the Maronites. The Greek Orthodox, as we noted, are historically a community much more open to a pluralistic and inclusive Middle East, and they are often victimized and alienated. Greek Orthodox intellectuals and militants have therefore opposed the Catholic Maronite hegemony with some of the longest violent saga since 1940’s. Any dissent is seen as betrayal and massacres or retaliation usually the result.
We can see that in order to counter violence, the Christian right wing militia had to use further violence to grab and keep control of a minimal geographical “Christian heartland”, that included at most of 3500 Km2, (about 30% of Lebanon). The classical patters of dehumanizing the enemy were fully exercised in Lebanon throughout the civil war. The Palestinians were “alien intruders”, the leftist Christians were simply “traitors” or “Jackals”. Sunni Nasserites were “Egyptian agitators” polluting Lebanon with Arab-ism. No enemy was seen or talked about as a legitimate “Lebanese” fighting for a valid belief. The Muslim / leftist front used similar tactics to demonize the Christian far right. The most common way to describe the Maronite-led Christian forces was terms like “Isolationist” or Franj (French), meaning that they are sold agents of the West. Moreover, they were also called “Zionist agents” for their opposition to the P.L.O.
Unfortunately, The Christians under Bashir Gemayel and after his assassination reserved some of the ruthless violence to their follow Christian allies. In a certain sense, fighting against the Druze or the Muslims and especially the Palestinians was seen as ideologically necessary to preserve a certain Lebanon. On the other hand, annihilating the allied Christians in organized and bloody military raids and ambushes and muzzling any dissenting voice within the Christian communities was done in utmost disregard for any acceptable principles.
Lebanese civil war was very violent yet predictable. The dubious colonial legacy, double standards and post-colonial struggles of the Nation to achieve true independence were impossible to handle without violence. Numerous sources of violence were pre-existing before the outbreak of war in 1975: a tiny country with more than 18 religious groups infighting for power and subject to regional and international pressures from the Damascus, Cairo, Baghdad and Riyadh to the Vatican, Paris, London and Washington. The Intra-Christian sustained violence was much more surprising than the classical fight against the Muslims.
The Historiography of Lebanon would be very incomplete and flawed every time the Christians are depicted as a monolithic entity that fought for their survival in a sea of “ill-willing” Arabs. The right wing Christians did fight a war of survival for their economic and socio-political privileges, which gradually eroded long after the end of the war to the Muslims, both Shiite and Sunni. However, they were ruthless and increasingly violent against fellow Christians, making the Lebanese civil war much more complex, divisive and damaging than a simple “Christian against Muslim” explanation.
Krikor Tersakian, Montreal, 2011
Bibliography:
-Fisk, Robert Fisk: “Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War”. Oxford University Press, 1991
-Fuller, Graham E: “A World without Islam: Little, Brown and Company, Hachette, 2010
-Rogan, Eugene: “The Arabs: A History: Eugene Rogan”. Perseus Book, 2009, New York, ISBN 978-0-465-07100-5
-Time magazine article: Gemayel : Ruthless Idealist: Monday, Sept. 06, 2011 http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,949550,00.html
Appendix I
Time magazine article:
Gemayel : Ruthless Idealist: Monday, Sept. 06, 1982
Liberator. Warlord. Patriot. Power-mad. Those are some of the terms that Bashir Gemayel's deeply riven countrymen have used to describe their President-elect during his years as a leader of the Christian militia forces. Part political idealist and part storm trooper, Gemayel, 34, has shown he will use whatever means necessary to achieve his nationalist goals. His supporters argue that Lebanon's dire condition requires just that sort of toughness. Opponents claim that he is a fierce political animal dedicated to narrow sectarian aims.
Gemayel made his reputation for ruthlessness by the way he imposed his leadership over the diverse Christian militia groups during and after the 1975-76 civil war. In June 1978, Gemayel's forces lashed out brutally against former President the Suleiman Franjieh, who was one of his chief political opponents among the Christian population. In a lightning raid on the Franjieh summer resort village of Ehden, Phalangist soldiers murdered the ex-President's son and political heir Tony, along with his wife and two-year-old daughter. Gemayel coldly dismissed the episode as a "social revolt against feudalism." And in July 1980, Gemayel's troops virtually wiped out the Christian militia of ex-President Camille Chamoun's National Liberal Party for refusing to accept the Phalangist line.
The baby-faced Gemayel consciously cultivates a macho image, often appearing in public in military fatigues, his feet squared in the "at ease" position, his arms folded across his chest. To his Phalangist followers, he projects the personal magnetism of a combat leader who has fought and suffered with them on the battlefields. After his family, he is most comfortable with his troops.
The President-elect's father Pierre Gemayel was the founder and original leader of the Phalangist Party, a hard-line, fervently nationalistic faction of the country's large Maronite Christian community. The youngest of six children, Bashir Gemayel enthusiastically embraced his father's conservative ideology, which was inspired by the nationalist movements of Francisco Franco and Benito Mussolini.
Gemayel fervently believes that the departure of all foreign forces is a prerequisite to solving his country's problems and forging national unity. He was particularly anxious to see the Palestinians go. Says an Arab diplomat who has known Gemayel for many years: "He is absolutely obsessed with the Palestinians."
Gemayel launched his military career when he was still a boy. During the brief age war of 1958, he officially joined the Phalangist militias at the age of eleven. He began regular military training two years later, and by 1969 was commander of a 100-man militia in his family's native village of Bikfaya, east of Beirut. Educated by the Jesuits, Gemayel took a law degree at St. Joseph's University of Beirut in 1971, but abandoned a short-lived law practice at the onset of Lebanon's civil war. In 1976 he became commander in chief of the Phalangist militias when his predecessor was killed in action. Soon afterward, he took charge of the Lebanese Forces, the unified command of all the Christian militias. The man who lives by the sword has very nearly died by it. In March 1979, a bomb was defused in his car. In February 1980, his 18-month-old daughter and three bodyguards were killed by a car bomb that did go off. Nonetheless, Gemayel continues to appear openly in public and insists on driving around alone, although he changes cars as often as ten times a day as a precaution. His security measures will almost certainly be tightened now that he has reached the pinnacle of national power: in a violent land, Bashir Gemayel has many enemies.
