First Anniversary of Georgia's bloodied nose

Georgia's ill fated attempt to reclaim South Ossetia and Abkhazia was a total disaster. Was it wrong advice from "friends" or just an Indiana Jones style adventure from Tbilisi? Russia did not lose time to crush the over optimistic Georgians and practically annex South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Click on map to enlarge.

August 7-8, 2008 were memorable days.

The whole world was glued to the TV sets for the stunning opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics. The "Bird's Nest", or the Beijing National Stadium had become the epicenter of the world.

Yet on practically the same day, the tiny Caucasian state of Georgia had launched massive attacks on the secessionist South Ossetia province, directly challenging Russia. The timing of the Georgian attack was very bizarre and intriguing: A major offensive within a few hours of the Beijing Olympics opening ceremonies? What was going on and who was really pushing for such a suicidal showdown?

The Georgian government claimed it was only responding to the constant shelling and intimidation from South Ossetia and was forced to send in its tanks to retake the rebel-held regional capital Tsikavali. Tbilisi wanted to swiftly reoccupy South Ossetia, but this large scale offensive was bizarre both in its timing and the ultra optimism about its possible success. Moscow did not find all this funny and the Russian Bear got ready to pounce back, and it did.



Georgia's tensions with Russia and the two breakaway regions have always been high since the collapse of the Soviet Union, but they became even higher ever since Mikhael Saakashvili came to power on 25 January 2004. The new President was determined to move Georgia much closer to the Western sphere and out of the Russian zone of influence, as if Russia did not exist next door. Georgia demanded the closure of all Russian military bases on its territories, put itself firmly in the Western camp, established supposedly very close ties with the "Oil and Gas obsessed" Bush administration and even applied to join NATO as a full member state: this was the ultimate insult to Russia.



Georgia's anti Russian stance since the fall of the Soviet empire was amplified by the training of the Georgian troops by some 170 NATO military advisers and were supplied with Western military fatigues and some military hardware. The Georgians obviously came to have a highly overestimated and distorted image of their new military might and political support from the forces opposing Russia. And that proved to be a fatal miscalculation.



Mr Saakashvili was also eagerly waiting for the day he would try to bring a military solution to the Ossetia and Abkhazia problems and restore Tbilisi's authority over these regions once and for all, just like he had successfully done in Adjaria-Batumi in 2004. (Important to note that Adjaria has no common borders with Russia, an crucial fact in Georgia's military success).







The message from this Russian soldier to the Georgians is finger clear. The picture is of a Russian convoy on the battlefront. The Russian easily crushed all forms of organised Georgian armed resistance.





Moscow's response was pretty swift, with mounting pressure to destabilize the Georgian Government through South Ossetia and of Abkhazia, which both share long borders and close ties with Russia. Moscow claimed to be under the obligation to defend the Russian citizens of these provinces and moved towards the recognition of these regions as "independent". Just like the West had acted to recognize the legitimacy of Kosovo's Independence from Serbia. Therefore the rationale was straight forward:If the West can recognize a separate Kosovo, then why not recognize independent Ossetia and Abkhazia? Georgia called all these developments as "shameless land grabs", while Moscow called them "self determination of these freedom seeking Russian citizens".



The war between the two looked inevitable, but few expected Saakashvili to send in his troops first! The ant attacking the elephant type of a mismatch.



In any case, something went wrong with president Saakashvili's entourage, when he decided to force a war. He had indeed timed this military attacks to coincide with the Olympics despite the claims otherwise, but that looked a bit like a medieval military strategy. Countries used to attack enemy states when the other King was away for a while on a hunting expedition in the remote woods or attending a prince's week long wedding festivities...



Vladimir Putin was in fact in Beijing when the news of the attacks broke out, but he did not waste any time to fly to the conflict zone and assume direct control of the events and assume the driver's seat. Within a few hours Moscow had already moved in. The Russian army recaptured South Ossetia and the tanks were on their way to Gori, into Georgia proper. The Russians soon cut the main road linking the capital Tbilisi to the ports on the Black Sea. All significant military and strategic sites in Georgia were bombarded and the country's fragile infrastructure heavily damaged or simply occupied. The Russian Black Sea fleet imposed a total maritime embargo. Poti and the nearby town of Seneki were taken. Russian troops reached the outskirts of Tbilisi and established checkpoints. The Tbilisi international airport was shut down, while the military airfields of Marneuli and Vaziani were heavily bombed.



Like in most wars, the civilian populations paid the ultimate price, as tens of thousands were ethnically cleansed and expelled from their homes. More than 400 people lost their lives, thousands injured and many more lost their homes and were unfortunately displaced.

A Georgian woman holding her baby cries over her damaged home in Gori, Georgia, just outside the breakaway province of South Ossetia Aug. 10, 2008. (David Mdzinarishvili/Reuters)









Georgia was practically fragmented into pieces and Tbilisi government was reduced to a mere scared spectator's role, hiding in underground shelters and arranging for the occasional candlelight press conferences to the media.



Naturally the war affected the whole region. Landlocked Armenia was deeply affected, as that neighbouring country's main supply and transit routes pass through Georgia and Poti's harbour in particular. The security of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline was also endangered, which made some people in Washington very nervous!



Same story in Abkhazia, where the secessionist forces took total control of all the disputed territories and expelled the collapsing Georgian regulars from the disputed and highly strategic Kodori Gorge (see map). They reasserted their absolute independence from Tbilisi and reaffirmed their strategic alignment with Mother Russia.



The short war turned out to be very ugly, a brutal lesson in regional "real-politics". Moscow was in no joking mood and sent a very loud and clear message: "Do not mess with me in my own historical backyard, and that includes the Caucasus". The same message to NATO was also crystal clear: "Better know your limits, because we are going to set them in any case!"



The war ended in August 17, and by that time there was not much left to fight for.



Either Tbilisi was badly misled by its over enthusiastic patrons and allies, or it had decided to adopt a fatalistic "It's now or never'' type of cow-boy approach to re-establish its authority over south Ossetia and Abkhazia. The jury is still out, but the real reasons for such adventurous approach were probably a mix of the two scenarios.





Who looks more scared: Georgian President Saakashvili or his bodyguards?

Note the use of NATO sub-machine guns as opposed to the classical Russian AK-47s, as part of Georgia's deliberate "Western" image remake.







The war was indeed short and very unequal. The total capitulation of Georgia was not surprising. Rather more surprising was Moscow's swift and determined response as well as the lack of any tangible support from Georgia's supposed allies in the West. Tbilisi's flirtation with NATO and especially Washington was exposed to its bare bones and Saakashvili had nowhere to hide. Moscow could have taken him down along with his government, but chose to spare his life and not to topple the Government. Tens of thousands of Georgian refugees were not as fortunate as their well spoken but obviously so wise president. They are still suffering today.



As a result, South Ossetia and Abkhazia became even more independent than before. The Georgian army will need years to rebuild itself and its credibility as a viable fighting force. The country's infrastructure was heavily damaged and a huge humanitarian problem. Not many positives for Georgia.

Most observers blame Saakashvili for this catastrophe. The United States and NATO could not do much except for sending couple of warships with "humanitarian aid'' to support the victimised Georgian brothers. Tbilisi's government was reminded something most seventh graders around the world would know: You do not mess with Russia in his own backyard, otherwise you will get a very bloodied nose, crippled arms and an amputated leg or two.

Georgia cried foul and blamed the separatist movements, but her own treatment of Georgia"s minorities does not inspire much confidence. The very sorry state of the Armenian minority in the southern Javakhk-Akhalkalaki region is another serious case of concern. Tbilisi needs to have a hard look in the mirror before formulating any kind of accusations of separatism toward the want away minorities. Javakhk’s Armenians face almost systematic discrimination, their churches confiscated and converted, schools forgotten and the region's already archaic infrastructure abandoned. There is a state of total desolation and neglect of Javakhk's socio-economic situation, in a concerted effort to alter that province’s ethnic composition and assimilate the population into "mainstream" Georgian.





President Serge Sarkisyan of Armenia greeting his Georgian counterpart in Yerevan. Saakashvili assured that he is sparing no efforts to improve the treatment of the Armenian minority in Georgia, but concrete results are scarce. Some felt that Armenia gave the Georgian President too much respect he did not fully deserve. Armenia is landlocked, badly needs Georgia for most external trade and transit and suffered huge financial losses because of the war. The borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan are closed due to embargo and conflict.





So what was the mystery behind Georgia's ill-fated adventures? Were there promised political as well as military support which failed to materialize? Did Saakashvili think that his western education, fluent English language skills, media savvy approach and CNN-friendly sound bites would be enough to stop the Russian tanks from crushing his troops and destroying his country?



Now Saakashvili can certainly kiss goodbye to South Ossetia and Abkhazia, both firmly attached to Russia. His very risky poker move backfired and his allies and advisers did not have a plan B to rescue him from losing face and territory. On the eve of the war's first anniversary, a NATO spokesman in Brussels even announced that "Georgia is not yet ready for NATO membership", an admission of total failure.





Both NATO and Uncle Sam were reduced to marginal observers while Putin was firmly in the driver's seat.





Even American vice president Joseph Biden's recent address to the Tbilisi Parliament could not mask the plain and painful truth. Financial aid to reconstruct Georgia may pour in from the West but that is not enough to stop Russian tanks or retake lost territories. There are definite limits of what Washington and NATO can accomplish in the Caucasus. All the flag raising ceremonies, bonfires, candle vigils marking the first anniversary of the war will not do much in terms of getting South Ossetia and Abkhazia back.



As Elton John would sing:



It's sad, so sad,

It's a sad, sad situation,

And it's getting more and more absurd.

Oh it seems to me that sorry seems to be the hardest word.

© Krikor Tersakian,  Aug 5, 2009

The strategic importance of the Black Sea

"The battle of Sinop, 1853": Russian navy destroying Ottoman ships on the Black sea. Imperial Russian navy destroyed Ottoman eleven Frigates and Corvettes anchored in the harbor. It was the start of the Crimean war. (Painting by Armenian seascape painter Hovannes Ayvazovski) The Black sea has always been less ''sexy'' than its bigger and more important neighbour, the Mediterranean: Less prominent, more marginal and less understood, especially in the West. The strategic importance of the Black sea is easily underestimated despite its huge importance . The very heterogeneous countries that occupy the shores of the Black sea are a sure indication of its importance. Since pre-historical times this sea has played a pivotal role in the European as well as Asian history. Endless cultures and civilisations have thrived, ruled, colonised and disappeared from its shores. Hittites, Scythians, Thracians, Greeks, Romans, Byzantines, Persians, Genoese, Venetians, Tatars, and various Slavic and Turkic tribes can all trace all or part of their history. This vast region has seen a constant movement of tribes, armies, protected trade routes and political powerhouses. And that is not changed a bit today.

Satellite image of the Black sea and the larger Mediterranean. The sea of Marmara links the two through the Bosporus and Dardanelles (Canakkale) staits.

The Russian Empire has always aspired and fought hard for a secure and easy access to the ‘’warm’’ waters, that is the Mediterranean. The North Sea and the Baltic are too disconnected from the Mediterranean world and the Suez canal. Therefore the Black Sea was the natural body of water that could provide them such important access and influence. The various conflicts and wars between the Russians and the Ottomans are a sure testimony of that strategy.

In recent history, the fault lines of the Persian, Ottoman and Russian Empires were vaguely along or near the shores of the Black Sea. During the cold war, the East and the West were also locking horns over these bodies of water. The Mediterranean being firmly in the N.A.T.O. fold, while the Black sea was a bastion for the Soviets and allied navies. The passage of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles as well as the Black sea itself have been the theater for infamously fierce and absurdly tragic wars between various powers near and far. In antiquity, the most famous battle surely is the Trojan wars. Troy is located just at the mouth of the Canakkale (Dardanelles) strait leading to the Marmara and eventually the Black sea. The Crimean War (1853-186) as well as well as the Russian-Turkish war that followed (1877-78) were directly for the control of the Black sea and the competing influence of these nations over the area. At that time even the western powers of Great Britain and France were directly part of the conflict, initially to curb the Russian appetites vis-a- vis a crumbling Ottoman Empire.

The Black Sea as seen from the at the edge of the Bosporus (Anadolu Kavagi village) These above mentioned wars were very bloody, but probably the single bloodiest and most famous of these apocalyptic wars was Galipoli /Dardanelles straits campaign during the WWI (1915-16). It was fought between The German/Turkish alliance and the mostly British -Australian-New Zealand forces, again for the control of these strategic routes and access to the Black sea. This war resulted in up to 500,000 killed and wounded. The Turks did not surrender and that bloody campaign made Mustapha Kemal (later Ataturk) a rising hero. Some would argue that the Black sea is rather large internal lake connected to the Mediterranean through the sea of Bosporus, the sea of Marmara and the Dardanelles. It is a much less salty sea than the Mediterranean and the oceans. Its rather fresh water surface and the ore salty bottom rarely mix resulting in particularly peculiar see plankton of dark colour making the water look dark or 'Black': hence the name. The area of the Black sea is of over 435.000 km2, which is about 14 times the Republic of Armenia or 40 times Lebanon. This huge body of water is of course shared by many countries: Turkey, Georgia, Russia, Ukraine, Romania and Bulgaria. Moreover, the ‘’autonomous’’ breakaway regions of Georgia, Adjaria and Abkhazia are also located there.

It is very interesting to note that none of these countries have their Capital city or a really major other city on the shores of the Black sea. The major cities or state capitals such as Kiev, Sofia, Bucharest etc are inland, far from the shores. Was this caused historically by security issues to avoid attacks and vulnerability? (Istanbul's northern suburbs on the Bosporus barely touch the Black Sea).

In any case, the strategic importance of the Black sea is here to stay. Landlocked countries like Moldova and Armenia depend on it even with no direct access. It is estimated that 80% of Armenia's maritime trade passes through the port city of Poti on the Georgian shores. Russia and Ukraine have been squabbling over sovereignty of chunks of the seashore, as the bulk of the ex Soviet navy is stationed there, including areas claimed by Ukraine as her own.

Russian and Ukraine Commanders aboard Russian navy ships during celebration of 225th anniversary of Black Sea fleet on May 11, 2008 in Sevastopol. Russia's Black Sea Fleet is present in Sevastopol under a lease that expires in 2017. The "arrangement" is a frequent source of tension between Russia and Ukraine. Turkey holds the most important strategic access key and is heavily reliant on the trade. Immense prosperity is generated by the traffic flowing between the Mediterranean and the Black sea. Turkey does have the strategic upper hand, but it can not ignore international treaties. The most important of these is the Montreux Convention Regarding (signed 1936) the Regime of the Turkish Straits. Montreux gives Ankara relative control over the Bosporus and the Dardanelles Straits, both of which fall totally within Turkey. Military activity and movements in the whole region are closely monitored which of course includes the only access to the Black Sea. Turkey has military control over the Straits but also has to abide by and enforce the restrictions and regulation on the passage of warships belonging to all other nations. Montreux Convention guarantees the free passage of civilian vessels in peacetime but severely restricts the passage of non-Turkish military vessels and prohibits some types of warships including aircraft carriers from passing through the Straits. The terms of the convention have always been contested by some nations, most notably the ex Soviet Union (and now Russia). Russia needs easy passage to the Mediterranean sea and beyond for its Black sea based merchant and military fleet. The various restrictions imposed by the Montreux Convention are somehow seen as restrictive by Moscow. But these same restrictions also help control any western military presence in the Black sea, Russia's backyard. The Icon and the Bikinis: Over-enthusiastic Russian women greeting the returning Russian warships after their victory over Georgia (Sevastopol navy base, Ukraine) ! After all, the Black Sea remains a mostly ''Russian'' influence zone, while the Mediterranean is the ''West''. The traditional zones of influences remain little changed, even if the Cold War is supposedly over. A good illustration of this division of zones happened in 2008 during the Georgia-Russia armed conflict over South Ossetia. Georgia got crushed by the Russian army after being given false hopes and assurances by the West. After that military debacle and as a token of "solidarity'' to the beaten Georgian government, the Bush administration sent a sole American warship to the destroyed Georgian port of Poti. Washington could hardly afford to do much more to help Tbilisi than timidly send a "hospital" battleship to distribute some goods and candies. So much for direct American influence in the Black sea. But the same can be said for the Russian fleet in the Mediterranean.



Family Picture: The heads of states and representatives of the Black Sea Economic Council (BSEC) countries and observers. (2007 conference, Çiragan palace, Istanbul).

On 25 June 1992,the Heads of State and Government of eleven countries: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine signed in Istanbul the Summit Declaration and the Bosporus Statement giving birth to the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). Serbia also joined in 2004 while Cyprus and Montenegro were vetoed out!

The BSEC came into existence as a ''unique and promising model of multilateral political and economic initiative aimed at fostering interaction and harmony among the Member States, as well as to ensure peace, stability and prosperity encouraging friendly and good-neighbourly relations in the Black Sea region". Very noble and idealistic!

If the past is any indication, the Black Sea region badly needs all the help it can get to preserve some kind of long lasting peace among its bickering and infighting member states...

© Krikor Tersakian, Montreal, Canada